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COMMON LAW DECEIT: ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY
UNDER SECTION II OF THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933; IMPLIED CIVIL LIABILITY
UNDER RULE 10b-5
An independent public accountant audited and certified the annual
financial statements of a corporation. These statements were then issued
to the stockholders and the Securities and Exchange Commission as re-
quired by that agency's rules and regulations.' The accountants, sub-
sequently hired to conduct special studies of the corporation's past and
current income and expenses,2 discovered that the figures in the annual
report were substantially false and misleading.' Not until several months
later did they disclose this finding to the exchange on which the corpora-
tion's securities were traded, to the SEC, or to the public at large. In a
class action against the accounting firm for damages in connection with
the corporation's financial statements and interim statements, defendants
cross moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (b)
(1) and 12(b) (6). The District Court for the Southern District of New
York held, motion denied: The complaint was sufficient; no reason was
found to bar plaintiffs from the opportunity to prove a common law action
of deceit. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).'
The principal issue raised by the motion was whether there is a con-
tinuing duty on the part of a certifying accountant to promptly and
publicly disclose any material information he acquires indicating that
financial statements which he has certified and filed with the SEC are
false.
Plaintiff's claim was grounded on the common law action of deceit,
attacking defendant's non-disclosure or silence.
Since most cases of deceit involve affirmative misrepresentations, dif-
ficult problems arise as to whether the passive failure to disclose after-
acquired information can serve as the foundation of a deceit action.'
Historically, the general rule was that an action would not lie for non-
1. The filing of the annual report is required by Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1967),
pursuant to § 13(a) (2), Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1964) and
SEC Rule 13a-1 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (1967).
2. The accountants served two functions during the period in question: first, as statutory
independent public accountants and then, following certification, as dependent public ac-
countants.
3. There is factual dispute here. The accountants maintain that the falsity of the
figures was discovered after the filing of the required 10-K report with the SEC; plaintiffs
contend that the discovery was made before this filing.
4. For other published opinions dealing with this controversy, see 249 F. Supp. 539
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (denial of motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a stay pending
the resolution of certain factual determinations by the Interstate Commerce Commission)
and 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (determination that a class action could be maintained).
5. W. PROSSER, TORTS 710 (3rd ed. 1964).
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disclosure.6 Lord Cairns stated in Peek v. Gurney7 that there was no duty
to disclose facts, however morally censurable their non-disclosure may be.
This was his statement of the law as shaped by an individualistic phil-
osophy based upon freedom of contract.
The importance of the Fischer decision is two-fold: (1) a drawing
away from the idea expressed by Lord Cairns and (2) an imposition of
an objective duty to speak whenever justice, equity and fair dealing de-
mand it.
There is a considerable amount of confusion as well as actual con-
flict concerning the liability of a defendant for financial loss resulting
from plaintiff's reliance on defendant's innocent misrepresentation.' The
question arises in connection with the two actions of negligence and de-
ceit. Historically, deceit developed as a remedy for financial loss while
negligence, so far as liability for misrepresentation 9 was concerned, de-
veloped in the field of physical injury to person or property.' Scienter
has been considered to be a necessary element in the action of deceit,'1
but an innocent misrepresentation by hypothesis involves no deliberate
fraud. Therefore, in the action of deceit there would seem to be no liabil-
ity for innocent misrepresentation. However, there have developed
groups of cases, each handling the problem differently. One group ad-
heres strictly to the elements of deceit and has held that an honest belief
in the truth of one's statements is a defense.' 2 Professor Williston vigor-
ously criticizes this view, contending that the results obtained are incon-
sistent with the law of misrepresentation in warranty or estoppel, and
that liability should be broader.'8 The other group of cases have modified
the requirements to different degrees and have allowed recovery for honest
misrepresentation in deceit. 4 Professor Bohlen contends, however, that
6. Cases cited note 12 infra.
7. L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873).
8. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 525, 552 (1938); Bohlen, Misrepresentation As Deceit,
Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARV. L. REV. 733 (1929) ; Carpenter, Responsibility for
Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentation, 24 ILL. L. REV. 749 (1930); Keeton,
Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 583 (1958); Smith,
Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARV. L. REV. 184 (1900) ; Williston, Liability for Honest
Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REv. 415 (1911).
9. The American Law Institute regards a misrepresentation as an assertion not in
accordance with the truth. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 525, comment b at 60 (1938).
10. Bohlen, Misrepresentation As Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARV. L. REV. 733
(1929).
11. The elements of deceit are: (1) a false misrepresentation of (2) a material fact;
(3) the defendant must know of the falsity (scienter) but make the statement nevertheless
for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to rely on it; (4) the plaintiff must justifiably rely
on it and (5) suffer damages as a consequence. W. PROSSER, TORTS 700 (3d ed. 1964).
12. Union Pac. Ry. v. Barnes, 64 F. 80 (8th Cir. 1894); Dwyer v. Redmond, 103 Conn.
237, 130 A. 108 (1925) ; Lamberton v. Dunham, 165 Pa. 129, 30 A. 716 (1895); Duff v.
Williams, 85 Pa. 490 (1877) ; Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
13. Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REV. 415, 434-40
(1911).
14. National Bank v. Hamilton, 202 111. App. 516 (1916) ; Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117
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this formula imposes a liability without fault and urges that to hold
persons liable is in effect to require a warranty of them.15 Dean Green
adheres to still another approach, i.e., that the transactions involved vary
so greatly in their requirements of certainty and accuracy that no general
rule adaptable to all cases can be formulated.' 6
Thus, for the most part the concern has been with the question of
the proper action for the enforcement of the liability rather than whether
such a liability should exist in a particular case.
With the declining importance of the form and theory of the action
under modern code pleading, it is the nature of the defendant's conduct
rather than the form of his recovery with which we must be chiefly con-
cerned.
Hopefully the courts will apply some standard which will give a
measure of certainty and at the same time a measure of justice. With
respect to negligence certain situations, or combinations of situations,
'recur with such frequency that it is possible to find a fairly definite ex-
pression of judicial opinion as to the manner in which persons who find
themselves therein should conduct themselves, e.g., the standard of rea-
sonableness in the law as to restraint of trade. 1 7 Justice Holmes expressed
a similar idea in the following passage:
If, now, the ordinary liabilities in tort arise from a failure to
comply with fixed and uniform standards of external conduct,
which every man is presumed and required to know, it is ob-
vious that it ought to be possible, sooner or later, to formulate
these standards at least to some extent and that to do so must at
last be the business of the court. It is equally clear that the fea-
tureless generality that the defendant was bound to use such
care as a prudent man would do under the circumstances ought
to be continually giving place to the specific one that he was
bound to use this or that precaution under these or those circum-
stances.'"
Mass. 195 (1875); Harris v. Delco Prods., 305 Mass. 362, 25 N.E.2d 740 (1940) ; Braley v.
Powers, 92 Me. 203, 42 A. 362 (1898); Peterson v. Schaberg, 116 Neb. 346, 217 N.W. 586
(1928); Lawson v. Vernon, 38 Wash. 422, 80 P. 559 (1905); Osborne v. Holt, 92 W. Va.
410, 114 S.E. 801 (1922).
15. Bohlen, Misrepresentations As Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARv. L. REV.
733, 743-45 (1929). See Pumphrey v. Quillen, 165 Ohio St. 343, 135 N.E.2d 328 (1956),
noted in 55 MIcH. L. REV. 461 (1957). The law review note concludes that the court is
imposing strict liability.
16. Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. Rav. 749, 761 (1930).
17. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934) § 285, comment c at 747:
If the standard of obligatory conduct is not fixed by a legislative enactment, it is
that of a reasonable man under the circumstances which, at the time of his action,
the actor knows or has reason to know. This standard is, without more, incapable
of application to the facts of a particular case. It requires further definition, so as
to express the opinion of society as to what should be done or left undone by a
reasonable man under the circumstances of the particular case.
18. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 111 (1881).
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Could not courts arrive at a standard of fair conduct equally appli-
cable to the situation at hand?
In the instant case Judge Tyler is in effect adopting such an approach
by imposing an objective standard against which to measure a defen-
dant's action. This objective standard "leaves no room for an analysis of
the subjective consideration inherent in the area of intent."' 9 Thus the
standard adopted for the purpose of determining when a duty of dis-
closure exists is analogous to the standard of due care under the same
circumstances in the field of negligence. 20
Plaintiffs additionally contend that the disputed allegations against
the accountants could be maintained under section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.
Several federal civil liability provisions protect investors from losses
due to improper conduct in connection with the sale or purchase of securi-
ties in interstate commerce.2'
Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 193422 authorizes the
Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate rules and regulations
to prevent "manipulative and deceptive devices." Rule 10b-5, 21 the gen-
eral "anti-fraud" rule, was created thereunder and with its expanded use,
serious questions as to the scope of this provision remain unanswered.24
These provisions do not specifically provide a private cause of ac-
tion; however, the federal courts have taken them to establish a civil
remedy under which an injured investor may sue.25
19. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
20. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, (1964) A.C. 465, [1963] 2 All E.R. 575.
21. Federal Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11-12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1964) ; Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 §§ 9, 10b, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j, 78r (1964); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1967). See Shulman, Civil Liabilities and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national exchange-
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security registered on
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1967).
24. Courts initially imposed the requirement of privity on 10b-5 liability. See, e.g.,
Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per
curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
Recently, courts have been willing to allow suits where privity of contract does not
exist. See Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Miller
v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Freed v. Szabo Food
Service, Inc., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 91,317 at 34,364 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Comment, Civil Liability Under Section
lOb and Rule 10b-5; A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L. J. 658
(1965).
25. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Boone v.
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Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 193326 (available only to a
securities purchaser) specifically allows civil relief for misconduct identi-
cal with that treated by clause (2) of Rule 10b-5.2 7 In addition, section
11 of the 1933 Act28 and section 18 of the 1934 Act29 provide a right of
recovery for misrepresentations of a special kind-those appearing in a
registration statement (also the prospectus) or in any document filed with
the SEC. Under section 11 the defendant may avoid liability by proving
he actually did investigate and still had reasonable grounds to believe
the statement was true. With respect to these four general provisions,
what about our old nemesis scienter?
Several cases, in an action involving Rule 10b-5, have shown a will-
ingness to let a buyer sue under this provision without pleading and prov-
ing scienter. In Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co.80
the opinion indicates that a plaintiff need only prove that a statement upon
which he relied was in fact false, or that an omission was misleading.
In Dack v. Shanman,31 arising under clause (2) of section 17 (a)
of the Securities Act of 1933 (containing language virtually identical to
Rule 10b-5, except that it only applies to misdeeds in connection with the
sale of securities), the court stated that it was sufficient that defendant
made an untrue statement or omitted to state a material fact.
The scienter question was not squarely in issue before the court in
Kohler v. Kohler, but in the dicta the court said: "The only traditional
elements of common law fraud that definitely appear to be unnecessary
under the statute are scienter-knowledge of the falsity or misleading
nature of the statement-and fraudulent intent to mislead or misrepre-
sent."W2
In Freed v. Szabo Food Service, Inc."3 the court sustained the plain-
tiff's cause of action, holding that all that is necessary for a lOb-5 suit
is that plaintiff allege reliance upon the misstatements by the defendant,
purchase of securities, and resulting injury.
Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962); Estate Counseling Serv. Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962) ; Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp.,
282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) ; Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), which is a leading case.
26. Federal Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
27. Section 12(2) is restricted in several senses, the most notable being a short, one
year statute of limitations. See Federal Securities Act of 1933, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
30. 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Texas Con-
tinental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962).
31. 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
32. 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (emphasis
added).
3. CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 91,317 at 34,364 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
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The direction of movement is in not requiring the proof of scienter
in a 10b-5 suit, thus envisaging suits for negligence under a provision re-
ferred to as the "anti-fraud rule." Since privity is no longer a prerequi-
site in this area,84 and the scienter requirement is questionable, workable
limits to liability under Rule 10b-5 remain undefined. It is not incon-
ceivable then that courts may be asked to apply, under the guise of 10b-5,
modern tort concepts such as liability without fault and spreading of
losses. This would result in sections 11, 12 (2) and 18 becoming mere sur-
plusage, which is, in the writer's opinion, undesirable." While the appro-
priateness of a reallocation of cost may be desirable in the area of a
manufacturer's warranty, such a reallocation in the securities market
raises significantly different problems.
Even though plaintiffs in the instant case would be denied recovery
under 10b-5, the provision which would be appropriate in section 11 of
the 1933 Act.36 Under section 11, an accountant certifying financial state-
ments for purposes of registration must affirmatively show that a rea-
sonable investigation37 had been made and that he has reasonable ground
to believe, and did believe, that the statements were true, and that there
was no omission of a material fact. The purpose of this section is to insure
full and honest disclosure of all relevant material covering a new security.3 8
If a registration statement becomes effective and such statement
contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted a material
fact, subsection (b) of section 11 enumerates the steps an accountant
should take to exculpate himself from liability. In addition the accountants
could have advised the SEC of the overstated earnings.3 9 They could
34. See cases cited note 24 supra.
35. It is felt that this is not in accord with the legislative history of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. See, S, Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; S. Doc. No. 185, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. Rep. No.
1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964):
In case any part of the registration statement ... contained an untrue statement of
a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein
... any person acquiring such security ... may . . . sue-
(2) Every person who was a director of . . . or partner in the issuer at the
time of the filing of the ... registration statement ....
(4) Every accountant . . . who has . . . certified any part of the registration
statement ....
37. In considering a "reasonable investigation" Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478
(S.D. Cal. 1939) established a standard which has been severely criticized. See Note, Civil
Liability Under the Federal Securities Act, 50 YALE L.J. 90, 98 (1940); Rappaport, Ac-
countants' Responsibility for Events Ocurring After Statement Date: The Shonts Case, 95
J. ACCOUNTANCY 332, 334 (1953). For cases dealing with accountants' duty, see In re Touche,
Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957); In re Mckesson & Robbons SEC
Acct. Ser. Rel. No. 19 at 30 (1940), 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. g 72,023 at 62,070; In re
Cornucopia Gold Mines, 1 S.E.C. 364 (1936).
38. See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1712, 1805 (2d ed. 1961); H.R. Rep. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933); Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933,
43 YALE L.J. 171, 173 (1933).
39. See Adolf Gobel, Inc., SEC Release No. 5003, at 3-4 (Feb. 18, 1954).
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have withdrawn their certificate.40 Or they could have sent a notice to
management and to the regulatory agencies."
The settled rule of statutory construction is that, where there is a
special statutory provision affording a remedy for particular specific
cases and where there is also a general provision which is comprehensive
enough to include what is embraced in the former, the special provision
will prevail over the general provision, and the latter will be held to apply
only to such cases as are not within the former.
42
The writer favors the result but not the approach taken in Fisher.
Even though the existence of explicit liability under the Securities Act
has been held not to negate implied liabilities arising from violations of
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder,43 it is felt
that the accountant's liability should be based on section 11.
RONALD R. BAIRD
THE APPEALABILITY OF A CONVICTION
BASED ON A PLEA OF GUILTY
The defendant, represented by his court-appointed counsel, withdrew
a plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to a charge of burglary.
He was found guilty and sentenced. The defendant then filed a notice of
appeal. The trial court treated the notice as a petition for relief under
Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 and denied it as frivolous.' On appeal, the
State moved to dismiss on the ground that the conviction was based on a
plea of guilty. The Second District Court of Appeal held, motion denied:
An accused in a criminal case has a right to appeal a judgment of con-
viction even though he has waived trial by jury and pleaded guilty. The
supposed "rule" that a conviction based on a plea of guilty cannot be
appealed finds no support in Florida other than in the dicta of cases which
on appeal were decided on the full merits. Ramey v. State, 199 So.2d 104
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).2
By denying the State's motion to dismiss, Florida became part of the
growing majority of jurisdictions that reject the rule that a conviction
based upon a plea of guilty cannot ordinarily be reviewed on appeal. Only
40. See Wall Street Journal, Oct. 18, 1966, at 32, col. 2, re Continental Vending Machines,
Corp.
41. See Wall Street Journal, Oct. 17, 1966, at 4, col. 2, re Public Bank of Detroit.
42. Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
43. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); see also J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964).
1. Brief for Appellant at 1, Ramey v. State, 199 So.2d 104 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
2. Subsequently, the case was disposed of in a per curiam decision which affirmed the
trial court's holding. Ramey v. State, 201 So.2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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